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TORTS-1960 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN W. WADE*
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As usual, there were about forty reported Torts cases this year.
There were no striking new developments. Many of the cases were
merely routine, some of them indeed carrying quite long opinions
without deciding anything which will give them real value as precedents for the future. The great majority of the cases involved actions
for negligence, considerably more than half the cases being concerned
with traffic accidents.

I.

NEGLIGENCE

A. Breach of Duty
1. Patrolmen Chasing Speeding Car.-Perhaps the most interesting
case was United States v. Hutchins,' decided by the federal court of
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 268 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1959).
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appeals. The action was under the Federal Tort Claims Act but
necessarily turned on the negligence law of Tennessee. 2 Two patrolmen, employees of the Atomic Energy Commission, stopped one
Hutchins for an apparent traffic violation. They smelled liquor on his
breath and decided he was intoxicated; he did not have a driver's
license. While they were using their car radio to communicate with a
superior office, he slipped back to his car and started to drive it away
to escape. The officers immediately chased him in their patrol car,
with the red blinker light flashing and the siren sounding. The chase
continued at high speed for more than a mile until Hutchins crashed
into two other cars at an intersection, killing one of the occupants.
Hutchins is now in the state penitentiary, having been convicted of
manslaughter. This action is by his fourteen-year-old daughter, who
was in his car and was injured. Judge Taylor in the federal district
court held for the plaintiff on the ground that the officers were negligent in chasing Hutchins as they did.
The court of appeals reversed, declaring that the "officers would
have been derelict in their duty had they not pursued the escapee in
the reasonable manner in which they did pursue him," and adding
that Hutchins' negligence was the "direct and proximate cause of
injury to his daughter . . . . 3 For its holding the court cited a Kentucky case which was directly in point,4 and found not in point the
Tennessee cases relied upon by the court below imposing liability on
an arresting officer who wrongfully shoots a fleeing misdemeanant.
The problem is a close one. The newspapers carry frequently stories
of persons crashing into innocent third parties when chased by a
patrol car.5 The risk is an easily foreseeable one if the "escapee"
appears to be driving recklessly, and the damage may be horrifying.
Are the police really justified in chasing a clearly reckless driver,
especially when they are able to identify him and can arrest him
later?6 On the other hand, if making the pursuit can subject them to
2. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides for liability of the United States
for negligence "if a private person would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (1959).
3. 268 F.2d at 72.
4. Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1952).
5. See, for example, Mothers, Martyrs of the Speed Age, a seven-page picture spread in Life, Jan. 18, 1960, pp. 16-23, describing and picturing the
parties and families of a collision caused when a Seabee home on leave was
chased by police at a very high rate of speed and crashed into another car.
Two mothers and a teenage boy were killed, and four other mothers were
critically injured.
6. Compare the statements in two out of four letters to the editor of Life,
commenting on the picture story described in the preceding footnote:
"... Why do the police chase these lawbreakers at such uncontrollable speeds,
endangering innocent lives? There must be a more cunning way to trap law
violators." "This killing and maiming of innocent motorists by speeding
lawbreakers being chased by speeding police must be stopped. Better the
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suit and second-guessing by the fact-finder as to the reasonableness
of their conduct, highway patrolmen may become far less effective.
Surprisingly, the Kentucky case seems to be the only one directly
in point. There are cases holding that patrolmen must be careful in
using their cars when making arrests. Thus liability has been imposed for swerving in front of a car to stop it and causing it to hit
a telephone pole;7 and for leaving a patrol car on the opposite side
of the road with lights burning, thus producing an accident. 8 There
are shooting cases which provide closer analogies, too. Thus several
cases hold an officer liable when he negligently hits a third person
while shooting at an escapee.9 Some analogy is also to be found in
cases imposing liability on an officer who fires in the direction of a
car and hits a tire, producing a blowout and car wreck which injures
the occupants. 10 The major problem is certain to be presented to the
courts again" and eventually the holdings are likely to turn upon
interpretations of the facts rather than on a crystalized rule of nonliability.
2. Highway Contractor's Failure to Warn of Danger.-Another interesting case presenting what must be a recurring problem but one
on which there seems to be very little reported authority is Sherman
White & Co. v. Long.'2 A highway contractor, relocating a highway,
set off a dynamite blast which damaged the old highway and caused
it to be temporarily obstructed. A line of cars backed up for two
miles but the contractor had no signs warning of the dangerous condition of the road and no flagman at the end of the line. One Palmer,
coming over "a rise in the highway," crashed into the last car of the
line before he could stop. 13 This was not an action by Thomas, the
driver of the stationary car, against Palmer's employer and the construction company as joint tortfeasors. Instead, the employer paid
Thomas and sued the contractor for indemnity. All three courts (trial,
intermediate and supreme) held that a demurrer to the declaration
lawbreaker should get away than cause the death of one innocent motorist."
Life, Feb. 8, 1960, p. 22.
7. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Rush, 88 N.H. 383, 190 Ati. 432 (1937).
8. Lemonds v. Holmes, 241 Mo. App. 463, 236 S.W.2d 56, 22 A.L.R.2d 418
(1951); Hornshuh v. Alldredge, 149 Ore. 419, 41 P.2d 423 (1935).
9. Well's Adm'r v. Lewis, 213 Ky. 846, 281 S.W. 996 (1926); Reynolds v.
Griffith, 126 W. Va. 766, 30 S.E.2d 81 (1944); cf. Charleston ex rel. Peck v.

Dawson, 90 W. Va. 150, 110 S.E. 551 (1922) (gun goes off accidentally).
10. Jones v. State, 194 Tenn. 534, 253 S.W.2d 740 (1952); State ex rel. Harbin
v. Dunn, 39 Tenn. App. 190, 282 S.W.2d 203 (M.S. 1943).
11. In Sewell v. Mountain View Hotel, Inc., 325 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. App.

E.S. 1959), decided during this survey period, a drunken driver, being chased
by police, lost control of his car, left the highway and struck a car in a parking lot. Suit was not brought against the police, however.
12. 326 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn. 1959).

13. Since this was a ruling on demurrer the facts in the last two sentences
can be assumed to be true.
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should be sustained.
As a ruling on the suit for indemnity, the holding seems proper. It
is hard to agree with the plaintiff that Palmer's negligence was merely
passive while that of the contractor was active, and that the contractor
should therefore bear the whole loss. But the court made some statements reaching the holding which seem questionable. It regarded as
"inconceivable that the contractor, or any reasonable person, should
foresee that the last car in the line should be damaged by a negligent
motorist who suddenly appeared upon the scene and crashed into
the last car in the line."'14 Highway contractors do foresee this all
of the time and put up signs to warn of coming dangers; they usually
arrange for flagging cars down, too, and a custom to this effect should
be admissible evidence. If a truck or other vehicle is stalled in the
road, the driver may be negligent in failing to set out flares,15 and a
stationary car in the traveled part of a highway may constitute negligence. 16 This is, indeed, stated by way of dictum in another Tennessee
case within this survey period. In Luckey v. Gowan,17 defendant
swung out to pass an automobile parked partially on the road.
Plaintiff, coming in the opposite direction, in seeking to avoid
defendant, went off the road. A jury verdict for the defendant was
sustained, the court saying that it could not tell whether the basis
was plaintiff's contributory negligence or lack of negligence on defendant's part. The court made a point of declaring that a verdict
would have been warranted against the owner of the parked car if
he had been sued. 18
If one who stops in the traveled part of a highway can be liable in
negligence it would seem to follow that one who forces others to stop
in the highway by placing an obstruction there may be negligent if
he fails to take reasonable action to avoid the danger. It is interesting
to speculate what the result might have been in the Sherman White
case if the plaintiff had sued for contribution rather than indemnity.
3. Lending Car to Incompetent Driver.-An interesting question on
the duty of care to third persons owed by the gratuitous lender of an
automobile is raised in Barrett v. Reed.19 Defendant, engaged in painting a farm house for the owner, allowed the latter's fifteen-year-old,
14. 326 S.W.2d at 473.

15. See Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 12 (1959). In Inter-City Trucking Co. v.
Daniels, 181 Tenn. 126, 178 S.W.2d 756 (1944), violation of a statute requiring
flares was held to be so inexcusable as to amount to "gross negligence" and
therefore to "preclude reliance upon the defensive plea of contributory
negligence ...."
16. Cf. Annot., 131 A.L.R. 562 (1941).
17. 330 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
18. See also the three Tennessee cases described in Wade, Torts-1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1144 n.81 (1955).
19. 327 S.W.2d 68 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
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unlicensed son to borrow his car to drive to the barn. The son instead
drove the car onto the highway and negligently damaged the plaintiff.
A jury verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed.
The rule is well established, in Tennessee and elsewhere, that lending a car to an inexperienced or incompetent driver may constitute
negligence.20 Obviously, the borrower's violation of an instruction
to drive carefully or not to take a drink would not insulate the owner
from liability; similarly, though perhaps less clearly so, with violation
of instructions as to a particular route to take. The Barrett case goes
further, however, since the permission was not to take the car on the
highway at all. Other courts will probably agree with the decision
that the determination of whether liability should extend so far is
one of fact for the jury. Similarly, in Sadler v. Draper,21 a used car
dealer was held liable when his employee negligently loaned a car
to an incompetent drunkard, though this act was beyond the employee's authority. The act of lending was held to be negligence.
4. Emergency Doctrine.-The sudden emergency doctrine is treated
and relied upon in the collision case of Cawthon v. Mayo.22 The court
quotes from earlier Tennessee cases which had adopted the following
statement from Ruling Case Law: "One who in a sudden emergency
acts according to his best judgment, or who, because of want of time
in which to form a judgment, omits to act in the most judicious manner, is not chargeable with negligence."2 3 This quotation is misleading
and needs to be corrected. It suggests that the test is subjective-"his
best judgment." While the emergency, and the time available to form
a judgment are important factors to be taken into consideration in
determining whether the party acted reasonably or not, the test is
still an objective one of what is reasonable under the circumstances. 24
5. Imputed Negligence.-The subject of imputed negligence is given
a clarifying treatment in Archie v. Yates.2 5 Two teenage boys were
riding in a car which struck a mule at high speed. In a suit by the
rider (son of the owner) against the driver for negligence, the court
held that an agency relationship existed and the driver's negligence
was imputed to the rider. The supreme court explained that this
20. See PROSSER, TORTS 513 (2d ed. 1955); Annot., 168 A.L.R. 1366 (1947);
Wade, Torts-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV. 1218, 1229 (1957).
21. 326 S.W.2d 148 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959); see also Moore v. Union Chevrolet Co., 326 S.W.2d 855 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).

22. 325 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).
23. Id. at 645, quoting Coleman v. Byrnes, 34 Tenn. App. 680, 688, 242 S.W.2d
85, 89 (W.S. 1950), quoting Moody v. Gulf Ref. Co., 142 Tenn. 280, 293, 218
S.W. 817, 820 (1920), quoting 20 R.C.L. 29 (1918).
24. See PROSSER, TORTS 138 (2d ed. 1955).
25. 325 S.W.2d 519 (Tenn. 1959). See Seavey, Agency-1960 Tennessee
Survey, 13 VAND. L. REV. 987, 993-95 (1960).
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would be true in a suit involving a third party but that26 negligence is
not imputed in a suit between the parties themselves.
6. ContributoryNegligence.-Plaintiff was held contributorily neg-

27
ligent as a matter of law in Gable v. Tennessee Liquefied Gas Co.,

where a leaking valve on a butane gas stove was not repaired, to
plaintiff's knowledge. Conversely, in Pickens v. Southern Ry.,28 par-

ents were held not contributorily negligent when a five-year-old child
wandered out of a yard and was hurt. When a defendant was ordered
to plead specially, he was not permitted to rely on the defense of
contributory negligence without pleading it.29 Two cases mentioned
the unique Tennessee doctrine of remote contributory negligence but
did not discuss it.30 The Railroad Precautions Statute and its interpretation that contributory negligence merely mitigates damages were
treated in Poe v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 31 where it was reiterated
that the jury are to be instructed that they must mitigate damages if
they find the plaintiff contributorily negligent. This is of diminishing
importance now that the statute has been amended to provide that
contributory negligence in an action under the statute has the same
32
effect as at common law.

B. Proximate Cause
There must be a factual causal relationship between defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's injury in order to permit a recovery. This
was the basis of the decision in Ellis v. H. S. Finke, Inc.,33 where it
was not shown that a fall would have been prevented by a safety
device which defendant had failed to install on a hoist.
"The rule is well established in this State that if an injury occurs
from two causes, both due to the negligence of different persons, but
together constituting an efficient cause, all persons whose acts contribute to the injury are liable therefor, and the negligence of one does
not excuse the negligence of the other." This quotation from Judge
Howard's opinion in Barrett v. Reed34 is in accord with the treatises
26. This is the majority and approved result. See PROssER, TORTs 366-67
(2d ed. 1955). In reaching the result the court expressed disapproval of some
loose language in Pikeville Fuel Co. v. Marsh, 34 Tenn. App. 82, 232 S.W.2d
789 (E.S. 1948).
27. 325 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).

28. 177 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Tenn. 1959).
29. Sadler v. Draper, 326 S.W.2d 148 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
30. Donahue v. George, 329 S.W.2d 836 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959); Woods v.
Meacham, 333 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959); cf. Swift & Co. v. Phelps,
273 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1960) (Georgia doctrine of comparative negligence).
31. 326 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. 1959).
32. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1209 (Supp. 1959); see Noel, Torts-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1350, 1361-63 (1959).
33. 278 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1960).
34. 327 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
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and is sustained by the great majority of the Tennessee cases. It was
used to hold that a defendant negligently lending his car to a known
inexperienced driver is liable for an accident produced by the driver's
negligent driving. It also sustains the holding in Pickens v. Southern
Ry. 35 that a railroad may be liable for the death of a small child on
a round table frequently played on by children even though a lock
on the round table had earlier been broken by some unknown third
36
party.
But it seems to be contradicted by three cases during the Survey
period. In Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Head,3 7 plaintiff, a pedestrian
on a narrow bridge over railroad tracks, was struck by a negligent
driver who was trying to pass her and another car at the same time.
In an action against the railroad alleging that the bridge was too
narrow, the court holds fairly clearly that the railroad was under no
duty and therefore not negligent in failing to widen the bridge; and
it then goes on to say that even if it was negligent, the intervening
negligence of the car driver would cut off liability. If the railroad had
been under a duty to keep the bridge sufficiently wide, its negligence
would be because of the very risk that some negligent driver might
produce a collision. In United States v. Hutchins,38 patrolmen were
chasing at high speed an intoxicated driver who had a collision at
an intersection. The court held that the patrolmen were not negligent
but went on to say that the driver's "utter disregard ... of due care"
was "obviously" the "direct and proximate cause" of the injury. Once
again, if the patrolmen were negligent, it was precisely because of the
risk that developed. In Cawthon v. Mayo,3 9 a car negligently swung
out to pass another before topping the crest of a hill. Defendant,
driving in the opposite direction, had to swerve over on the muddy
road shoulder, lost control of his car and swung back into the highway
just in front of plaintiff's car, producing a collision. The court
reversed a jury verdict for plaintiff, apparently deciding as a matter
of law that defendant was not negligent under the sudden emergency
doctrine. Then it said: "We are unable to agree with plaintiff's
contention that a reasonable inference could be drawn from the facts
that the defendant's negligence in not bringing his automobile under
control and continuing on south along the wet shoulder of the road
constituted the proximate cause of the collision with the car driven
by plaintiff which produced his injury. '40 If defendant is held to be
35. 177 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Tenn. 1959).

36. See also Wilson v. Page, 325 S.W.2d 294 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958) (mistake

in cutting steel column, followed by negligent welding).
37. 332 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).

38. 268 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1959); see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
39. 325 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958); see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
40. Id. at 646. There was a dissent on this issue.
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negligent in failing to keep the car under control, as the quotation
seems to assume for the purpose, that negligent conduct is so clearly
the cause of the injury that there is no basis for argument.
In each of these three cases the real basis for the holding is that
the defendant was not negligent. They illustrate a common practice
of courts of talking loosely about proximate cause and throwing it
in as an additional or alternate basis for a holding without thinking
this aspect of the opinion thoroughly through. 41
In Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks,42 the court explains that "it is not necessary that the precise manner in which an injury results be foreseeable." The difference between proximate cause in tort cases and in
contracts of accident insurance is discussed in Britton v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of America.43
C. Damages
The courts have frequently said that "the amount to be awarded in
44
personal injury cases lies largely in the discretion of the jury."
Sometimes the statement is made that the appellate court interferes
with the amount of a jury verdict only when it was so excessive as
to indicate passion, prejudice or caprice on the part of the jury.45 But
where the jury rendered a verdict for more money for damage to a
motorcycle than it was worth, a remittitur was properly suggested. 46
In Wilson v. Page,4 a negligent welding job on a steel truss caused
a partially completed building to collapse. Plaintiff was allowed to
recover damages for the cost of removing the structure, reconstructing
the building, loss of use and expenses incurred by conducting the
business in another location. Plaintiff had agreed with his brother
to have the building ready for occupancy by a certain date and the
partnership had been required to use another location. He was allowed to recover his own half of the expenses and to obtain reimbursement of the other half of the expenses, which he had paid his
brother under the contract.
The amounts of recovery proved noteworthy in some cases. Where
a car ran into a man and crushed him, causing extreme damages,
41. "In these cases the defendant is simply not negligent. When the courts

say that his conduct is not the 'proximate cause' of the harm, they not only
obscure the real issue, but suggest artificial distinctions of causation which
have no sound basis, and can only arise to plague them in the future." PROSSEr,
TORTS 253 (2d ed. 1955).
42. 330 S.W.2d 569, 572 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
43. 330 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tenn. 1959).
44. Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks, 330 S.W.2d 569, 573 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
45. See, e.g., Sadler v. Draper, 326 S.W.2d 148, 159 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
46. Fitzsimmons v. Brock, 330 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958) (verdict
for $4,250 for personal injuries and $750 for damage to motorcycle; latter
reduced by remittitur of $379).
47. 325 S.W.2d 294 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958).
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$85,000 was allowed.4 8 A fall breaking the heel bones of a painter
produced a verdict of $42,500.49 An automobile accident breaking a
woman's back in two places was held to warrant a verdict of $10,000
for her and $5,000 for her husband. 50 The verdict for the husband was
$1,250 for damages to the automobile and $3,750 for loss of services
and consortium. The death of a five-and-a-half-year-old child produced
51
a judge's finding of $14,000 damages.
Reading from the mortality tables in the Tennessee Code was held
52
not to be error in Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks.
D. ParticularRelationships
1. Traffic and Transportation.-The significant legal principles involved in traffic cases have already been discussed. A classification of
types of accidents may perhaps also be useful. A number of cases
involved collisions of moving automobiles.5 3 In others a car struck a
stationary automobile.5 4 Others involved a collision between a car
and a train, 55 a car and a motorcycle, 6 and a car and an animal.5 7 In
other cases a car struck a person.5 8 In two cases one car forced another on to the shoulder of a highway, with resultant loss of control; 59
in another the car left the road on a curve. 60 In several cases guests
sued the driver. 61 In one a tree fell on a car.62 One case involved an
48. Sadler v. Draper, 326 S.W.2d 148 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
49. Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks, 330 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).

50. Barnard v. Binns, 326 S.W.2d 676 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
51. Pickens v. Southern Ry., 177 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Tenn. 1959).
52. 330 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
53. E.g., United States v. Hutchins, 268 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1959); Barnard v.
Binns, 326 S.W.2d 676 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959); Barrett v. Reed, 327 S.W.2d
68 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959); Wagner v. Niven, 332 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1959); Cawthon v. Mayo, 325 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).
54. Sherman White & Co. v. Long, 326 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn. 1959) (line of
cars caused by road obstruction); Sewell v. Mountain View Hotel, Inc., 325
S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959) (car in parking lot off road); Moore v.
Union Chevrolet Co., 326 S.W.2d 855 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958) (car stopped to
allow another to back out).
55. Poe v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 326 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. 1959).
56. Fitzsimmons v. Brock, 330 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958).
57. Archie v. Yates, 325 S.W.2d 519 (Tenn. 1959) (mule); Overbey v.
Poteat, 332 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. 1960) (steer).
58. Sadler v. Draper, 326 S.W.2d 148 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959) (plaintiff
near parked car on side of street); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Head, 332
S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959) (plaintiff walking over narrow bridge);
Woods v. Meacham, 333 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959) (plaintiff walking
along side of road).
59. Lucky v. Gowan, 330 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959); Cawthon v.
Mayo, 325 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).
60. Fellows v. Sexton, 327 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
61. Lucas v. Phillips, 326 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. 1957) and Fellows v. Sexton,
327 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959) involved actions under guest statutes
of other states. Archie v. Yates, 325 S.W.2d 519 (Tenn. 1959) and Wagner v.
Niven, 332 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959) involved actions under Tennessee law, where there is no guest statute.
62. Walls v. Lueking, 332 S.W.2d 692 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
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63
airplane crash.

2. Property Owners.-(a) Invitees-A landowner owes an invitee
the duty to use due care to make his premises safe. Two problems
arise in applying this principle: (1) who is an invitee and (2) when
is the standard of due care breached. Three applicable cases held the
64
following to be invitees: a prospective customer in a grocery store,
6
5
an employee of a painting contractor engaged in painting a pole and
a trucker hauling coal from a strip-mine. 66 In the first case the court
held that a reversal of the customary arrangement of "in" and "out"
doors did not present a jury issue of negligence but that a jury verdict
for the plaintiff was justified by the dangerous fashion in which the
"out" door suddenly opened. In the second case recovery was permitted where a pole which the plaintiff was painting suddenly collapsed because of a concealed defective condition. In the last case
a dead tree fell on plaintiff's trucks from a cliff above the location,
where it could not have been seen. A directed verdict for defendant
was affirmed on the ground that in the large wooded area involved
due care did not require inspection of a tree which could not be seen.
"The invitee assumes all normal risks attendant upon his use of the
premises ....
The danger of falling trees lurks in all wooded and
mountainous areas. It is a danger incident to the use of the premises
by invitees of the owner or proprietor and, therefore, a normal risk
which the invitee assumes when he enters upon the land." 67
(b) Attractive Nuisance.-Pickens v. Southern Ry.68 is the classic
attractive nuisance case. The attractive nuisance doctrine arose out
of a series of railroad turntable cases, and the Pickens case involved
a child who was killed on an unused railroad turntable. There were
the classic elements of children commonly playing on the turntable
and the failure to keep it effectively locked, and the court rendered
the expected holding for the plaintiff.
(c) Animal owners.-The liability of an animal owner is treated in
Overbey v. Poteat,69 where a steer broke through a fence on to the
highway, where it was struck by the plaintiff. The court declared that
the common law rule of strict liability for cattle was abolished by
statute in Tennessee more than one hundred years ago; and while
there have been statutory modifications since that time the court held
that they must be construed as indicating that liability is based on
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Morton v. Martin Aviation Corp., 325 S.W.2d 524 (Tenn. 1959).
Kroger Co. v. Thomas, 277 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1960).
Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks, 330 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
Walls v. Lueking, 332 S.W.2d 692 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
Id. at 695.
177 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Tenn. 1959).

69. 332 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. 1960).
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negligence.70 The lower court decision for the defendant was therefore
affirmed.
3. Contractors.-InBelk v. J. A. Jones ConstructionCo.,7 1 where the

defendant construction company built a building in accordance with
specifications, leaving a hole at the second-floor level which was covered by a sheet of plywood, it was held not liable to a person who
unwittingly drove a truck into the hole. The court declared that defendant was not negligent in following the owner's instructions, and
added that defendant had delivered the building to the owner three
months previously.
On the other hand in Wilson v. Page,7 2 where a subcontractor improperly welded a steel H-column, causing a building to collapse, he
was held liable for all direct and consequential damages, the court
declaring that since the action was based on tort, it was "immaterial
in what capacity [he] was acting, whether as plaintiff's employee, as
'73
[the contractor's] employee or as an independent contractor.
In Gable v. Tennessee Liquefied Gas Co.,74 a company which had
installed a butane gas system in failing to replace in accordance with
the promise of its employee a valve which later began leaking was
found to be negligent, but the contributory negligence of the owner
in continuing to use the system though he knew the valve had not
been replaced, was held to bar his recovery.
4. Products Liability.-In Ellis v. H. S. Finke, Inc.,7 5 the seller of
a Material hoist had failed to put on it a safety device which the
manufacturer had supplied. It was held not liable for injuries caused
by a falling platform because plaintiff failed to show that the safety
device would have prevented a fall, but the court quoted the statement of the trial judge that if this had been shown he would have
submitted the case to the jury.
5. Bailments.-In Morton v. Martin Aviation Corp.,7 6 an advanced
student checked out an airplane from a flying school and crashed it.
In an action by the school for the value of the plane, a jury verdict for
the plaintiff was affirmed, the court relying strongly on the statute
providing for a presumption of negligence when property bailed in
70. It was aided in reaching its conclusion by two treatments in the Tennessee Law Review: 20 TENN. L. REv. 374 (1948); and Comment, Animal Lex,
25 TENN. L. REV. 471, 477-82 (1958).
71. 272 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1959).
72. 325 S.W.2d 294 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958).
73. Id. at 297. An action against a highway contractor is treated earlier.
See Sherman White & Co. v. Long, 326 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn. 1959), supra note
12 and accompanying text.
74. 325 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
75. 278 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1960).
76. 325 S.W.2d 524 (Tenn. 1959).
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good condition is returned in a damaged condition. 7 In a concurring
opinion the presumption was likened to the doctrine of res ipsa
78
loquitur.
The scope of the innkeeper's strict liability for chattels was considered in Sewell v. Mountain View Hotel, Inc. 79 The liability was
held not to apply to an automobile placed by the guest himself in a
parking lot made available by the hotel, and the court said responsibility for injury or loss of the automobile must be based on negligence.
II. OTHER TORTS

1. Defamation.-The slander case of Smith v. Fielden8o carries a
warning for plaintiffs' attorneys that they must plead the innuendo
clearly and specifically. Defendant was charged in the declaration
with saying to plaintiff, a newspaperman, ". . . you are drunk, and
you were driving that car under the influence." This was held not
to be slanderous per se since it did not also charge that plaintiff's
driving took place on a public highway or in the state of Tennessee
and therefore did not include all the elements of the statutory crime.
This seems quite technical 8' but the declaration could easily have
been drawn to show where the driving took place. It was also held,
in accordance with the majority rule, that a charge that a newspaperman is drunk is not injurious to him in his profession and therefore is
not slanderous per se on this basis.
The opinion in Lamb v. Sutton82 is probably the final one in the
lengthy litigation arising out of Pat Sutton's "talkathon" in his
campaign six years ago against Senator Kefauver. Claiming that
some remarks about him were defamatory, Lamb sued Sutton and
two television stations. The Federal Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee sustained the defense of the stations that they were
granted an implied immunity when they were forbidden by the Federal Communications Act from censoring the political broadcasts, 8 3
77.

TENN. CODE -NN. § 24-515 (1956).
78. Compare also the statutory presumption of agency when one other than

the owner is the driver in a car accident. TENN. CODE Axn. § 59-1037 (1956).
This statute was involved in two cases during the Survey period. Sadler v.
Draper, 326 S.W.2d 148 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959); Moore v. Union Chevrolet
Co., 326 S.W.2d 855 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).
79. 325 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).

See Merritt, Personal Property

and Sales-1960 Tennessee Survey, 13 VAND. L. REv. 1189-91 (1960).
80. 326 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1959).
81. It is strongly reminiscent of the rules of pleading of some of the very
early English cases, "by which 'Thou art as arrant a thief as any is in England' was not actionable until it was pleaded that there were thieves in
England, and 'Thou art a murderer, for thou art the fellow that didst kill
Mr. Sydnam's man' required an averment that any man of Mr. Sydnam's
had in fact been murdered." PROSSER, TORTS 580 (2d ed. 1955).
82. 274 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1960).
83. Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1958), 12 VAND. L. REV.
301 (1958).
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and this holding was later vindicated by a decision of the United
States Supreme Court.84 The current case affirmed a holding of the
district court that while there was no specific allegation in the pleadings that Sutton and Kefauver were "legally qualified candidates"
within the provisions of the act, this was adequately taken care of by
the proof.
2. Deceit.-In Smoky Mountains Beverage Co. v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 85 the plaintiff, a local distributor for the defendant beer company,
successfully maintained an action for a "misrepresentation of fact"
by showing that defendant's agent impliedly indicated that the plaintiff's agency would be continued for at least a year when he required
their firm to go into the draught beer business, which would involve
a loss of profits. When the defendant cancelled the agency before that
time, the court awarded as damages the difference between actual
profits during the period and what plaintiff would have made if it
had continued on the original basis. Defendant's conduct involved a
promise for the future, and the tort action of deceit normally does
not lie unless it is proved that there was no intent to carry it out at
the time the promise was made,8 but the absence of an intent to
perform may perhaps also have been indicated by the evidence.
The plaintiff had also sought to recover on the ground of a "civil
conspiracy," but the court, after defining this as "a combination or
agreement between two or more persons to do a harmful, wrongful
injury to another person,"8 7 held that the proof did not warrant a'
recovery.8
3. Seduction.-A mother recovered $20,000 for the seduction of her
sixteen-year-old daughter, in Graham v. Smith.89 The court of appeals
affirmed, saying the jury were the ones to evaluate the defense of bad
character and reputation on the part of both mother and daughter.
4. Malicious Prosecution.-The decision in Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Morris9° is solely confined to damages. A jury verdict for
84. Farmers Educ. & Co-op Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959). For
discussion of these cases, see Noel, Torts-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND.
L. Rsv. 1350, 1372-74 (1959).

85. 182 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Tenn. 1960).
86. PROSSER, TORTS 563-64 (2d ed. 1955).
87. 182 F. Supp. at 333.
88. The debated question of whether conspiracy exists as an independent
tort is discussed in detail in 12 VAM. L. REV. 958 (1959), treating the case of
Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1958). See
also Dale v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 69, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948).

The wrongful injury in the Smoky Mountain case may well have been tortious interference with contract relations. See PROSSER, TORTS § 106 (2d ed.
1955).
89. 330 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
90. 273 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1960).
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$25,000 had been approved by the trial court, but Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals had reversed on the ground that the damages were too
large. 9' The trial judge on reconsideration suggested a remittitur of
$7,500; and the court of appeals, while indicating that the damages
were still higher than it would desire, nevertheless held that the
92
district judge had not abused his discretion.

III. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Immunities.-The common law rule that a tort action for personal injuries cannot be brought between members of a family was
reiterated against vigorous attack in Prince v. Prince.93 The action
was one by a wife against a husband for injuries incurred in an automobile accident, and the court held that the presence of liability
94
insurance did not affect the result.
On the other hand, where a husband shot and killed his divorced
wife, the supreme court held in Brown v. Selby,95 that her administrator could maintain an action for wrongful death against the husband for the benefit of the children. This is in accordance with the
majority rule, but the court went on to give an "additional reason,"
which may presage future developments in the state. It said that the
reason for the common law immunity rule was to preserve domestic
peace and tranquility in the family. The father had destroyed this
by murdering the mother and had forfeited his right to the custody
of the children 9 6
The immunity of radio and television stations in connection with
97
political broadcasts has already been treated.
2. Statute of Limitations.-In Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Disspain,9 8 the statute of limitations had run on an action under the FELA,
but the court held it was tolled by the fact that the doctor to whom
the defendant had sent the plaintiff had x-rayed him and told him
there was nothing wrong with him, when he had a disc injury shown
by the x-ray negative. The case also held that when the parties testified as to different understandings as to whether a release covered
91. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Morris, 260 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1958).
92. The judgment, however, was modified so as to allow interest only from
the second order, not the original one which was appealed.
93. 326 S.W.2d 908 (Tenn. 1959).
94. It distinguished the earlier case of Lucas v. Phillips, 326 S.W.2d 905
(Tenn. 1957), which had been unreported up until that time, on the ground
that it involved the application of Arkansas law.
95. 332 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1960).
96. For an able treatment of the general problem, see Sanford, Personal
Torts Within the Family, 9 VA=. L. REv. 823 (1956).
97. See Lamb v. Sutton, 274 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1960), supra note 82, and
accompanying text.

98. 275 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1960).
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the total claim or merely medical bills, the jury verdict would control.
3. Mention of Insurance.-Woods v. Meacham9 9 is another case
which was reversed because an attorney brought out the existence of
liability insurance in questioning a witness. The court held it was not
enough for the judge to instruct the jury to ignore the insurance,
when the action of the attorney was deliberate and intentional.
4. ForeignLaw.-Guest statutes of other states were involved in two
cases, 100 and a comparative negligence rule of a different state was
applied in a third case. 101
99. 333 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
100. Lucas v. Phillips, 326 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. 1957); Fellows v. Sexton, 327

S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).

101. Swift & Co. v. Phelps, 273 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1968).

